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EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
I •  I NTRODUCT I ON 
1.  In  the  context  of  the  establishment  of  the  Single  European  Market, 
the  European  Councl Is  of  Hanover,  Rhodes  and  Madrid  considered  that 
the  same  Importance  shou I  d  be  attached  to  soc I  a I  as  to  economic 
aspects  and  that  they  shou I  d  therefore  both  be  _.developed  In  a 
balanced  manner.  The  European  Parliament  (In  numerous  ·resolutions 
taken  on  own  lnlatlve)  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  (in  its 
opinion of  22  February  1989)  have  taken  a  similar  view.  · 
2.  In  developing  this approach,  the  Community·  Charter of ·the Fundamental 
Social  Rights  of  Workers  states,  in  point  12,  Inter  al.la,  that 
employers  or  employers'organlzatlons, -on  the-One  hand,  and  workers' 
organizations,  on  the  other,  ~hall  have  the  right  to  negotiate  and 
conclude  collective  agreemenfs  under· the  conditions  laid  down  by 
national  legislation  and  p,ractlce.  In  point  17  of  the  Charter·  It 
states ·that  Information,  consu I tat ion  and  'part·i c I  pat ion  for  workers 
must  be  developed  along  appropriate  lines,  taking  account  of  the 
practices  In  force  In  ~he  varlou~ Member  States. 
3.  With  this  in.  mind,  In  It~  Action  Programme  relating  to  the 
Implementation of  th~ Cha'rter,  the  Commlssi0!1  announced  its  Intention 
to  present  a  Corilmun I ty  Instrument  on  "equIty  sharIng  and  f I  rianc I  a I 
participation  by  workers".  Underlining  'its  eat.ller  declarations  In 
favour  of  employee  partlclpatlon._ln asset  formation  and  in  productive 
capital  formation  as  a  device  for  a  gfeater· · ju~tlce  In  the 
distribution of wealth  and  as  a  means  for  attaining an  adequate  level 
of  non-Inflationary  growth,  the  Commis-sion  conslde'red  fhat  " ....  the 
requirements  of  economic  competition  as  wei I  as  new  management 
approaches  have  led  to  the  estab I I  shment  of'  var lou's  mechanIsms  for 
the  financial  participation  of  salaried  workers  which  meet  the 
objectives referred  to earlier,  as w'll  as others  where~y~the role of 
workers  In  enterprises  Is  reconcll~d  with  their  as~lratlons  for  a 
better  remuneration  and  with  the  financial  equilibrium  of  the 
enterprise." 
"  .  'i  ..  :  . 
In  accordance  with  the  Charter  and  as  announced  In  Its  action 
programme,  the  Commission  therefore  proposes  a  Recommendation  aiming 
at  facilitating and  encouraging  the  development  of  such  practices of: 
-"profit-sharing"  In  Its various  forms; 
- employee  share-ownership. 
The  nature  of  the  Instrument  chosen,  a  Counc 1 I  Recommendat .1 on,  1  s 
motivated  on  the  one  hand  by  the  nature  of  the  subject  which,  as 
shown  below,  strongly  suggests  that  preference  should  be  given  to  a 
non-binding  Instrument.  On  the  other  hand,  a  Council  Recommendation 
Is  a  more  appropriate  choice  than a  Recommendation  by  the Commission, 
given  the  view  expressed  by  I.a.  the  European  Parliament,  that  the 
status of  this  Instrument  should  be  sufficient  to  have  an  Impact  on 
all  part les. 
I I •  THE  CONTEXT 
A.  Antecedents and  preparations 
4.  The  24  June  1976  Tripartite Conference  had  asked  governments  and  the 
two  sides of  Industry  to  take appropriate measures  to encourage  asset 
formation  by  workers.  The  work  undertaken  In  the  few  years 
thereafter,  In  close  collaboration  with  experts  from  governments  and 
the  two  sides of  Industry  on  the  basis of  a  mandate  from  the  Council 
.. - 4  -
(Social  Affairs),  resulted  in  a  Memorandum  on  Employee  participation 
In  asset  format ion"  which  was  adopted  by  the  Commission  In  August 
1979.  This  Memorandum  did  not  contain  formal  Commission  proposals but 
rather  two  different  sets of  guidelines.  The  first  set  of  guidelines 
aimed  at  reinforcing  the  social  aspect  of  Incentives  to  Individual 
savings,  the  second  set  was  directed  towards  the  development  of 
systems of  financial  participation by  employees. 
5.  The  main  follow-up  to  this  Memorandum  and  Its  1983  addendum  was  a 
Resolution  adopted  by  the  European  Parliament  In  October  1983  In 
whIch  the  EP  supported  the  approach  taken  In  the  Memorandum  and 
reQuested  the  Commission  to  draw  up  a  Recommendation  on  the  subJect. 
The  Commission  was  not  able  to  meet  this  reQuest  in  the  years 
thereafter,  because  of  other  priorities  In  Its  work  programme,  but 
the  Issue  continued  to  receive attention  l·n  the  European  Parliament. 
6.  In  the  announcement  In  the  Action  Programme  of  Its  Intention  to 
present  a  Community  Instrument  on  eQuity  sharing  and  financial 
participation  by  workers,  the  Commission  outlined  an  approach  which 
is  different  from  the  one  followed  a  decade  ago  and  which  takes 
account  of  the  latest  developments  and  of  the  present  policies  in 
this  area  within  the  EC.  Rather  than  trying  to  cover  all  aspects  of 
general  asset-formation  pol Icy  or  of  Incentives  offered  to  the 
population  as  a  whole  or  to  specific  Income-groups  outside  the 
employment  context,  the  Instrument  wl  I I  focus  on  employee 
participation  In  the  profits  and  capital  growth  of  their  enterprise 
and  on  employee  share-ownership. 
7.  In  the  process  of  preparing  this  Community  Instrument  the  Commission 
has  funded  a  research  project  undertaken  at  the  European  University 
Institute  of  Florence,  with  .the  specific  aim  of  obtaining  a  good 
overview of  "the state of  the art"  concerning  financial  participation 
by  employees  In  the  EC.  The  results  of  this  project  are  being 
described  In  the  so-cal led  "PEPPER-Report"  (PEPPER  standing  for 
"Promotion  of  Employee  Participation  In  Profits  and  Enterprise 
Results").  The  following  descriptive chapters  (B-F)  largely summarize 
the  most  significant  findings  of  the  Report.  More  detai Is, 
bibliographical  references etc.  are  to  be  found  In  the  Report  itself 
(Supplement  3/91  to Social  Europe). 
a.  The  two  main  competitors  of  the  EC  on  world  markets,  the  USA  and 
Japan,  both  already  practlze  financial  participation  schemes  on  a 
more  substantial  scale  than  the  Community  does. 
Some  estimates  for  the  USA  suggest  that  over  the  period  1977-1987  the 
number  of  prof I t-sha  r I  ng  pI ans  has  r I  sen  from  300,000  to  500,000. 
Even  In  1978  around  17  mIll ion  workers  were  covered  by  reg i sterad 
employee  profit-sharing  schemes.  Following  tax  concessions 
encouraging  a  specific  form  of  financial  participation,  Employee 
Stock  Ownership  Plans  (ESOPs)  have  known  an  impressive  growth  to 
reach  In  1990  a  figure  of  some  10,000  ESOPs,  covering  10  million 
employees. 
In  Japan  financial  participation  by  employees  Is  already  a  long 
tradition,  although  some  characteristics  of  the  schemes  may  differ 
from  what  Is  usual  In  the  West.  Among  Japanese  enterprises  profit-
sharing  Is  widely  diffused;  profit-sharing  bonuses  are  usuallY  paid 
twice  a  year  and  are estimated  to account  for  as  much  as  25%  of  total 
employee  earnings.  Another  freQuent  practice  Is  to  encourage 
employees  to  purchase  company  shares.  Some  have  argued  that  Japan's 
low  unemployment  rate  and  level  of  inflation  can  be  attributed  to 
profit-sharing,  but  this  Is  almost  certainly an  oversimplification. - 5  -
B.  Typology of schemes  for  financial  participation by  employees 
9.  There  Is  a  wide  range of different  forms  of employee  participation  in 
enterprise  results.  These  can  be  grouped  under  two  main  categories, 
which  may  or  may  not  co-exist  and  may  In  some  cases overlap:  profit-
sharing,  and  employee  share-ownership. 
8.1  Profit-sharing 
10.  "Profit-sharing"  In  a  strict sense  Implies  the  sharing of  profits by 
providers  of  both  capital  and  labour,  by  giving  employees,  In 
addition  to  a  fixed  wage,  a  variable  part  of  Income  directly  linked 
to  prof 1 ts  or  some  other  measure  of.  enterprIse  resu Its.  ProfIt-
sharlng  provides  employees  with  a  regular  bonus  paid  out  of  profits 
which  would  normally  be  allocated  to  capital  but,  contrary  to 
trad.ltlonal  bonuses  linked  to  Individual  performance  (e.g.  piece 
rates),  profit-sharing  Is  a  collective  scheme  applied  to  all,  or  a 
large group of  employees. 
In  practice,  profit-sharing  can  take  various  forms.  At  the 
enterprise  level,  It  can  provide employees  with  Immediate  or  deferred 
benefits;  It  can  be  paid  In  cash,  enterprise  shares  or  other 
securities;  or  It  can  take  the  form  of  allocation  to  specific  funds 
Invested  for  the  benefit  of  employees.  At  higher  levels,  profit-
sharing  takes  the  form  of  economy-wide  or  regional  wage-earners' 
funds. 
Cash-based  profIt-sharIng  I Inks  employee  bonuses  dIrect I  y  to  some 
measure  of  enterprise  performance  (profits,  revenue,  value-added,  or 
other),  most  freQuently  providing  an  Immediate  payment.  However,  It 
can  also  be  a  deferred  scheme:  e.g.  If  a  certain  percentage  of 
profits  Is  allocated  to  enterprise  funds  which  are  then  Invested  In 
the  name  of  employees.  A  distinction  Is  also  made  between  gain-
sharing  and  profit-sharing  although  both  are  clearly  related;  gain-
sharing  typically  consists  of  a  group  Incentive  pay  system  that  Is 
geared  to  productivity,  cost-reduction  or  other  criteria,  less 
comprehensive  than profitability. 
Share-based  profit-sharing  consists of  giving  employees,  in  relation 
to profits or  some  other  measure  of enterprise performance,  a  portion 
of  shares of  the enterprise where  they  work.  These  are usually  frozen 
In  a  fund  for  a  certain period of  time  before  the workers  are  allowed 
to  dispose  of  them.  When  shares  are  subject  to  a  minimum  retention 
period  the  term  "deferred profit-sharing"  Is used. 
8.2  EmPloYee  share-ownershiP 
11.  Employee  share-ownership  provides  for  employee  participation  In 
enterprise  results  In  an  Indirect  way,  I.e.  on  the  basis  of 
participation  In  ownership,  either  by  receiving  dividends,  or  the 
appreciation of  employee-owned  capital,  or  a  combination  of  the  two. 
While  such  schemes  are  not  directly  related  to  enterprise ·proUts, 
they  are  related  to  enterprise  profitability  and  so  enable 
participants to gain  from  the  growth  of  company  profits. - 6  -
Employee  share-ownership  can  be  both  Individual  and  collective. 
Shares  can  be  in  the  enterprise  where  the  employee  works  or 
elsewhere.  However,  the  draft  Recommendation  mainly  focuses  on 
those  employee  share-ownership  schemes  set  up  with  the  expl !cit 
Intention  of  providing  employees  with  an  additional  source of .Income 
related to enterprise results. 
Employee  share-ownership  can  take  many  different  forms.  Typically  a 
portion  of  company  shares  Is  reserved  for  employees  and  offered  at 
privileged  terms;  or  employees  are  offered  options  to  buy  their 
enterprise's  shares  after  a  determined  amount  of  time,  under 
favourable  tax  provisions.  Alternatively,  an  employee  benefit  trust 
Is  set  up  through  Employee  Share  Ownership  Plans  (ESOPs),  which 
acquire  company  stock  that  is  allocated  periodically  to  each 
employee's  ESOP  account.  Workers'  buy-outs  of  their  enterprises  are 
a  special  form  of  employee  share-ownership. 
In  the  literature,  the  generic  term  "employee  share-ownership"  Is 
frequently  used  to  denote  both  share-based  profit-sharing,  and 
employee  share-ownership;  "profit-sharing"  Is  sometimes  used  to  refer 
to both  profit-sharing  In  the strict sense of  profit-related pay,  and 
to share-based profit-sharing.  The  distinction between  Individual  and 
col lectlve employee  share-ownership  Is also not.always clear-cut. 
This  draft  Recommendation  refers  primarily  to  those  schemes  which 
are  :  Internal  (applied  within  an  enterprise);  collective  (available 
for  all,  or  a  major  part  of  employees);  continous  (applied  on  a 
regular  basis);  and  providing  for  employee  participation  In  some 
measure  of  enterprise performance  (whether  directly or  Indirectly). 
c.  Financial  participation schemes  In  economic  theory 
12.  During  the  1980s,  a  lively  debate  developed  among  economists  on  the 
possible  effects of  financial  participation  schemes.  Those  In  favour 
argue  that  there wl  I I  be  three main  types of  beneficial  effects. 
The  first  Is  the  Incentive  effect,  which  Is  expected  to  result  In 
higher  labour  productlvlty  and  Improved  overal I  enterprise 
performance.  Employee  Income  directly  Hnked  to  enterprise  results 
Is  expected  to  lead  to  higher  motivation  and  commitment,  greater 
identification  of  workers  with  the  Interests  of  their  firm,  lower 
absenteeism  and  labour  turnover,  reduced  Intra-firm  confl let  and 
labour-management  tension,  and  Improvements  in  work  organization. 
Other  related  possible  effects  are  a  contribution  towards  a  greater 
social  justice  In  the  distribution  of  total  wealth  and  an  Insurance 
against  managerial  opportunism,  by  an  encouragement  of  joint  wealth-
maximizing  behaviour.  More  Indirectly  related  are  effects  and 
objectives  such  as  an  improvement  of  employee  understanding  of  the 
fundament a Is  of  enterprIse  economIcs  or  the  encouragement  of 
positive attitudes towards  more  Industrial  democracy. 
The  second  theoretical  argument  Is  that  profit-sharing  provides  for 
greater  flexibility  of  labour  earnings.  By  Increasing  the .frequency 
of  adjustments  In  remuneration,  profit-sharing  is  likely  to  result  in 
less variable employment,  and  can;  therefore,  reduce  the pressure  for 
redundancies. - 7  -
In  addition  to  these  effects  expected  at  the  enterprise  level,  some 
economists  (J.  Vanek  and  t.t.  Weitzman)  have  proposed  that  profit-
sharing  could  have  stabilizing  macroeconomic  effects.  A  "share 
economy"  In  which  firms  give  employees  a  share  of  profits  as  a 
substitute for  a  part  of  their  wages,  could  have  Important  advantages 
over  a  "wage  economy".  Since  firms  would  regard  the  base  wage,  and 
not  total  remuneration,  as  the  relevant  marginal  cost  of  labour, 
profit-sharing  would  lower  the  marginal  cost  of  employing  extra 
labour,  and  therefore  could  not  only  raise  employment,  but  shift  the 
entire  economy  to  a  state  of  full  employment.  t.tonetary  policies 
could  then  be  used  to  fight  Inflation,  without  fear  of  creating 
unemployment. 
13.  A  number  of  Interrelated  arguments  against  financial  participation 
schemes  can  also be  found  In  the  literature, more  particularly  : 
a)  Weaken lng  of  property  r lghts.  Scholars  be longIng  to  the  Property 
Eights  School  have  argued  that  leglslat ion  encouraging  any  form  of 
economic  democracy  represents  a  continuing  erosion  of  property 
rights,  by  using  the  power  of  the  state  to  transfer  wealth  from 
owners  of  capital  to  workers.  profit-sharing  Is  thus  regarded  as  a 
purely  distributive  "vealth  confiscation  scheme"  without  potential 
Incentive  effects.  They  predict  a  large  negative  relationship 
between  employee  participation  and  performance,  due  to  loss  of 
managerial  control  and  the weaklnlng of  the authority of capitalists, 
and  Increased  demands  for  workers·  participation  In  decision-making. 
t.toreover,  where  workers·  earnIngs  Inc I  ude  a  share  In  profIts,  the 
relnvestable  surplus  wl  I I  be  lower  and  hence  growth  and  future 
employment  may  be  adversely affected. 
b)  Inefficiency of group  Incentives.  It  has  also been  argued  that  group 
Incentives  are  Ineffective,  since  Incentives  become  diluted  In  a 
group  settIng  where  rewards  are  I Inked  to  group  effort.  ProfIt-
sharlng  gives  each  worker  only  a  small  fraction  of  any  additional 
profit  due  to  his  own  effort;  workers  wi  II  therefore  be  tempted  to 
free-ride,  and  difficulties  in  monitoring  a  single  worker's 
contribution  will  arise.  However,  more  cooperative  behaviour 
resulting  from  financial  participation  (especially  If  accompanied  by 
decisional  participation),  could  offset  these  potential  negative 
effects. 
c>  Risk-bearing.  Financial  participation  schemes  may  also  expose 
workers  to  an  unacceptable  degree  of  risk.  Because  of  the  physical 
impossibility  of  diversifying  the  use  of  their  labour  In  different 
sectors  and  enterprises  In  the  economy  (as  capitalists  can  do  with 
their capital),  by  putting  "all  eggs  in  one  basket",  workers will  not 
only  bear  the  risk  of  unemployment,  but  will  also  face  additional 
Income  risk,  In  particular when  building up  participation  In  holdings 
(directly or  Indirectly) of  shares or  bonds  Issued  by  their  employer. 
This  additional  risk  may  however  be  compensated  by  higher  employment 
security which  profit-sharing  Is expected  to provide,  the exposure  to 
risk may  be  limited  If  workers  are excluded  from  full  entrepreneurial 
profits  and  losses  and  In  some  cases  forms  of  Insurance  may  help  to 
reduce  the  risks  (but  also potential  returns). - 8-
In  the  whole,  the  theoretical  debate  on  financial  participation 
schemes  has  by  Itself  not  yet  produced  overwhelming  support  for  the 
arguments  in  favour  of  or  against  financial  participation schemes.  A 
closer  examination  of  the  practice  of  such  .schemes  will  give  more 
clues  (see sections 20  to 30). 
D.  The  existing  legal  and  fiscal  framework  for  financial  participation 
schemes  In  the  EC 
0.1  General  features 
14.  The  legal  and  fiscal  status of  financial  participation  schemes  In  EC 
countrIes  is  very  heterogeneous.  The  French  experience,  based  on 
legislation  which  since  1967  has  made  deferred  profit-sharing 
(employee  participation  In  company  growth)  compulsory  In  enterprises 
of  a  certain  size,  clearly  contrasts  with  the  voluntary  nature  of 
financial  participation  schemes  In  all  other  EC  countries.  However, 
there  Is  also  substantial  variety  In  the  legal  and  fiscal  framework 
between  countries  In  which  schemes  are  voluntarily  Implemented  by 
enterprises,  especially  regarding  conditions  for  qualifying  for  tax 
benefits and  the  Incentives effectively offered. 
For  the  moment  two  EC  countries  have  comprehensive  legislation, 
consisting  of  specific  laws  for  the  various  types  of  financial 
participation  schemes  :  France,  since  1959;  and  the  UK,  since  1978. 
In  most  other  countries,  financial  participation  measures  of  a  more 
limited scope  have  been  adopted. 
Thus  In  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands 
and  Portugal,  favourable  fiscal  provisions  have  been  granted  to  some 
financial  participation schemes. 
Nevertheless.  measures  adopted  so  far  have  regulated  a  limited number 
of  specific  forms  of  schemes,  and  most  frequently  when  they offer  tax 
Incentives  these are modest.  Moreover.  these  provisions  have  usually 
been  adopted  as part  of  more.  general  legislation, e.g.  In  Germany  and 
the  Netherlands on  savings schemes,  and  In  Belgium  on  company  laws. 
In  ~.  Luxembourg  and  ~. there  are  no  specific  legal 
provisions  on  financial  participation and  consequently  no  particular 
tax  Incentives are  offered at  present,  although  provisions contained 
In  more  general  laws  do  envisage  the  posslbi I lty  of  Introducing 
financial  participation  schemes,  and  In  some  of  these  countries  the 
legal  framework  Is  not  unfavourable  (particularly  In~). 
0.2  Specific forms  encouraged 
15.  At  present,  the  prevalent  types of  financial  participation encouraged 
by  government  policies  through  tax  benefits  are  various  forms  of 
emp I  oyee  share-ownershIp  and,  to  a  I  esser  ex tent,  defer red  profit-
sharing,  whereas  cash-based profit-sharing  is  for  the  moment  actively 
supported  In  only a  few  EC  countries. 
16.  Government  measures  encouraging  various  types  of .employee  share-
ownership  are  found  in  all  countries  where  there  Is official  support 
forsome  form  of  financial  participation.  In  some  countries.  it  has 
been  the  only  or  principal  form  of  financial  participation  offered 
preferential  treatment.  Thus  in  Belgium.  tax  Incentives  have  for  the 
moment  been  granted  t'lXcluslvely  to  various  forms  of  employee  share-- 9  -
ownership;  In  GermanY,  the  Introduction  of  new  fiscal  provisions  in 
1984  was  a lmed  pr I  mar II y  at  encouragl ng  I  nd I  v ldua I  workers' 
contributions  to  enterprise  capital;  while  In  Ireland,  of  the  two 
laws  adopted  so  far,  one  Is  specifically destined  to  a  specific  form 
of employee  share-ownership  (stock options). 
Official  encouragement  of  employee  share-ownership  has  been  far  from 
lacking  In  other  countries.  In  Denmark,  offers of  enterprise shares 
to  employees  at  preferential  terms  have  been  encouraged  since  1958. 
In  France,  favourable  tax  provisions  have  been  granted  to  a  variety 
of  employee  share-ownership  schemes,  Including  stock  options  (since 
1970),  offers  of  shares  at  preferent I  a I  terms  (s I  nee  1973),  free 
distribution of shares  to employees  (since  1980),  employee  Investment 
funds  (since  1983),  and  employee  buy-outs  (since  1984).  In  Greece, 
legal  obstacles  for  the  free  distribution  of  a  company's  shares  to 
its  employees  were  removed  in  1987,  and  thereafter  employee  share-
ownership  (Including  share  options)  has  been  encouraged  through 
favourable  legal  provisions.  In  Portugal,  employee  share-ownership 
has  been  promoted  within  the  1990  privatization measures.  In  the  UK, 
fiscal  measures  have  encouraged  a  number  of  specific employee  share-
ownership  schemes,  Including  "BOGOFs"  (buy  one,  get  one  free, 
Introduced  In  1978),  all-employee  stock options  (the  so-called  SAYE-
"Save  as  you  earn"  scheme,  promoted  since  1980),  discretionary  share 
options  {since  1987),  and  ESOPs  (since  1989). 
17.  Deferred profit-sharing,  most  frequently  consisting of  the  allocation 
of  enterprise  shares  (or  other  securities)  to  employees  which  are 
frozen  for  a  certain  period  of  time,  or  directing  profits  to 
Investment  funds  for  the benefit of  employees,  has  been  encouraged  in 
several  countries  (Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands 
and  the  UK>.  In  Denmark,  employee  share  and  bond  schemes  offered 
within  a  profit-sharing  arrangement  have  been  given  preferential  tax 
treatment  since  1958.  In  France,  a  1967  law  Introduced  employee 
participation  In  company  growth.  This  was  obligatory  for  all 
enterprises  with  over  100  employees  (In  1990  extended  to  all 
enterpr lses  with  more  than  50  workers) .Under  the  scheme  a  part  of 
profits  Is  allocated  to  a  special  enterprise  fund  which  Is  then 
Invested  for  the  benefit  of  all  employees;  both  enterprises  and 
employees  are  exempted  from  tax  and  social  security  charges.  In 
Germany,  specific  Investment  funds,  sometimes  combining  enterprise 
resources with  employees'  savings  (which,  up  to a  certain amount,  are 
tax  free),  have  been  encouraged  since  the  early  1960s.  It  Is  only 
since  1984,  however,that  Investment  In  specifically  productive 
capital  has  been  actively  promoted  through  legislative  measures. 
Share-based  profit-sharing  has  been  encouraged  through  tax  exemption 
or  deduction  both  In  the  UK  (since  1978)  and  In  Ireland  (since  1982), 
on  condition  that  shares  are  held  In  a  trust  for  a  determined  period 
of  time.  In  the  Netherlands,  minor  fiscal  advantages  have  been 
granted  to  profit-sharing  since  the  1960s,on  condition  that  the 
bonuses  are  frozen  on  special  accounts  for  a  determined  amount  of 
t lme. 
18.  Finally,  cash-based  Profit-sharing  has  been  actively  encouraged 
through  specific  laws  In  only  two  EC  countries:  In  France  (since 
1959)  and  In  the  UK  (since  1987).  In  Greece  and  Portugal,  although 
no  specific  laws  have  promoted  this  type  of  financial  participation, 
provisions contained  In  more  general  laws  provide  fiscal  benefits  for 
both  firms  and  employees.  In  other  countries,  there  Is  no  supportive 
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the  Netherlands,  where  enterP.~{!j,~.§es  Introducing 
high  taxes  and  social  security  c~r:ltrlbutlons. 
such 
In  short,  the  large majorIty of  schemes  curre"".ly  encouraged  through 
governments  policies  are  those· which  allow  w{)·~~ers  to  acquire  their 
enterprise's  shares,  whether  automatically  <al~tn  the  case  of  share-
based  profit-sharing  or  distribution  of  c~bany  shares),  or  by 
stimulating  voluntary  employee  share-owner!!!i'HP  (through  workers' 
acquisition  of  enterprise  shares).·  This  seem~· to  be  reflection  of 
~~\:w·  .. 
common  and  Interrelated objectives  pursued  b~~·ndlvldual  governments 
and  enterprises.  Because  of  obligatory  ret~n;t"=lon  and  other  resale 
restrictions  on  shares,  the  majority of  schem'iS$  presently  encouraged 
are of  a  savings-oriented nature,  whether  thrd~\~h  the  allocation of  a 
r~"·'·" 
part  of  profIts to  specIfIc  enterprIse  funds :or;::  trusts,  or  even  more 
so  through  workers'  voluntary contributions  oiry,~~apltal. 
:~: 
Financial  participation schemes  In  practice 
General  features 
There  Is  a  great  variety  from  one  country  to  ~~other  In  the  types  of 
financial  participation  schemes  encountered~  In  practice.  These 
Include  cash  bonuses,  share-based  and  other  fotms of deferred profit-
sharing,  and  a  number  of particular  employee  $~.are-ownership schemes, 
such  as  free  distribution of  shares  to  employees  or  share  offers  at 
~ -.·: 
preferential  terms,  stock  options  for  all  employees  or  only  ·for 
executives,  employee  share-ownership  plans  ·;~or  trusts  (ESOPs  and 
ESOTs),  and  employee  buy-outs.  The  most  dlve.r·~Hied  forms  are  found 
In  the  UK  and  France.  !~ 
In  those  countries  where  some  form  of  flnanc·lal  participation  has 
been  encouraged  by  the  government,  the  pre~~:l'ent  types  app II  ed  by 
enterprIses  are  Indeed  the  ones  promoted  throug·h  off  1  c 1  a 1  government 
measures.  The  preferential  tax  treatment  gr.anted  particularly  to 
employee  share-ownership  and/or  deferred  prQf'it-sharlng,  does  seem 
to  have  led  to  their  prevalent  adoption·  ln'_practlce  {In  Belgium, 
France,  Germany,  Ireland,  the  UK).  ·  ·.  · 
In  Belgium,  employee  share-ownership  - th~.- only  type  currently 
encouraged  by  law- Is  the  principal  form of ~fJnancial  participation 
applied  by  enterprises,  as  the  unfavourabl~  and  uncertain  fiscal 
climate  for  other  forms  has  resulted  In  llmlt:ei.t  practices  of profit-
sharing.  In  France,  although  cash-based  PJC>Jit-sharlng  has  been 
institutionalized  for  more  than  three  dei;:~des,  the  number  of 
agreements  on  cash-based  prof I t-shar l.ng  In  1'~86  was  on I y  20  %  of 
those  concluded  on  "participation"  (obllgatorYJ;  moreover,  the  1986 
French  legislation explicitly encourages  w6rk'r'$· to  Invest  their  cast't 
bonuses  In  the  savings  fund  of  the  ente:bJ:;r lse  {which  Is  then 
reInvested,  frequent I y  In  enterpr lse  shares  l~>/  In  Germany,  emp I oyee. 
participation  In enterprise capital  Is  the  donih:tant  form,  and  80  X of 
employees  In  firms using  financial  partlclpatfp~ schemes  hold capital 
shares.  In  1  re 1  and,  s I nee  on 1  y  share-based  pfb_,f I t-shar 1  ng  and  share . 
options  are  currently  offered  preferentla·l  'f:Yscal  treatment,  these 
forms  are  a I so  the  most  wIdespread.  l.n  fhe  ·~UK',  at  present  84  X  of 
all  registered  schemes  are  of  this  type.· (72(:.-,are  var lous  forms  of· 
emp I oyee  share-ownershIp,  and  121 ..  shar~;based  profIt-sharIng· 
schemes>,  while only  16 X  are profit-related paY,: schemes.  ·· 
- :~)( -\ 
·''  _. 
·  ...  ·: 
.  ~  ' 
::_:·  "t. 
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In  countries without  specific  legislation on  employee  share-ownership 
c~.  Luxembourg,~>. and  In  those with only  limited,  or  fairly 
recently  Introduced,  Incentives  (Denmark,  Greece,  the  Netherlands, 
Portuga I),  cash-based  profIt-sharIng  stIll  today  seems  to  be  the 
prevalent  form  practised by  firms. 
E.2  Diffusion 
21.  Recently  there  has  been  a  significant  growth  of  various  forms  of 
financial  participation  schemes  In  the  majority of  EC  countries.  At 
present  financial  participation  Is  most  widespread  In  France,  with 
over  10,000  agreements  on  employee  participation  In  company  growth, 
and  an  additional  7,000  agreements  on  cash-based  profit-sharing.  In 
the  UK  there  are  currently  more  than  7,000  different  financial 
participation  schemes  In  operation,  applied  by  almost  30  X  of  all 
British  firms  (20%  have  at  least  one  all-employee  scheme,  and  an 
additional  9% have  schemes  for  executives only).  The  large majority 
of  schemes  In  the  UK  -over  4,300  - are  discretionary  share  option 
schemes,  as compared  with  1,200 cash-based profit-sharing,  around  900 
a I 1-emp I  oyee  share  opt I  on,  and  900  share-based  profIt-sharIng 
schemes,  and  only  around  20  ESOPs. 
In  general,  In  other  countries  financial  participation  schemes  are 
less  widely  used.  For  some  of  these  countries,  only  estimates  are 
available  at  present.  In  some  cases  these  are  highly  divergent 
depending  mainly  on  the definition used. 
In  Ire I  and  there  are  current I  y  around  250  regIstered  schemes,  of 
which  60X  concern  stock  options  and  40%  share-based  profit-sharing. 
In  Denmark  the  overall  number  of  schemes  Is  estimated  to  be  no  more· 
than  200,  the  most  common  being  cash-based  profit-sharing.  In 
Germany  some  1 , 600  f I  rms  have  Introduced  emp I  oyee  f I  nanc I  a I 
participation  schemes  but  If  informal  and  less  regular  arrangements 
are  also  Included,  there  may  be  as  many  as  5,000  firms  practising 
some  kind  of  financial  participation.  For  ~  It  has  been 
estimated  that  25%  of  large  firms  currently  give  their  employees 
variable  remuneration,  but  only  In  sompe  cases  directly  linked  to an 
Indicator  of  enterprise  performance;  In  addition,  around  30  Quoted 
companies  have  offered  shares  at  preferential  terms  to  their 
employees  In  recent  years.  In  the  Netherlands  about  30  X  of 
enterprises currently use  related schemes,  but  only  6%  can  be  said to 
have  a  "real"  profit-sharing  scheme.  For  Belgium,  no  estimates  are 
available  at  present  on  the  use  of  profit-sharing;  as  to  employee 
share-ownership,  20  Quoted  companies  offered  shares  to  their 
employees  In  1989.  In  Luxembourg  a  recent  survey  found  that  22  % of 
firms  had  Introduced  "profit-sharing"  but  without  specifying  which 
type.  In  Soaln  as  many  as  44%  of  medium  ami  large  firms  give 
employees  a  variable  component  of  pay  related  to  enterprise 
performance,  but  only  In  6  %  of  firms  are  these  payments  directly 
linked  to  profits.  For  Greece  and  Portugal,  no  estimates  are 
currently available on  the use of  financial  participation schemes. 
Not  all  the  schemes  providing  employee  financial  participation 
effectively  I Ink  employee  earnings  directly  to  an  Indicator  of 
enterprIse  performance.  Somet lmes  thIs  II nk  is  very  loose  1  ndeed, 
particularly  In~.~  and  the  Netherlands. 
.. 
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Enter  or I se  sIze  and  sector  a I  d 1st  r I byt I on  ~~~~-
No  clear  common,  pattern  seems  to  emerge  on:Yl'he  Importance  of  fIrm 
.  ...  '-~' r'  : 
size.  In  Germany  employee  financial  par~leipatlon  schemes  are 
adopted  maIn I y  by  sma II  fIrms,  a I though  Qg;·lte  a  few  very  1  arge 
enterprises  (with  over  10;000  workers)  have  ~a;jso  been  Involved.  In 
the  UK  mainly  large' companies  have  adopted~)bne  of  the  registered 
schemes  Qualifying  for  tax  benefits,  while  sm~;i'l  firms  have  tended  to 
Introduce  non-approved  cash..-based  schemes.  '>~tn  France  there  1  s  a 
mixture  of  both,  since  participation  schemes:t'used  to  be  obligatory 
primarily  in  larger  firms,  while  small  firm~:':-malnly  Introduce  cash-
based  prof I t-shar I ng.  In  Be I g I um,  J.!.A..!l:,  ~  and  Por tug  a I  I arge 
fl~ms seem  to be  predominant.  ~< 
<:; 
As  far  as  the  distribution of  schemes  by  lndu:stry  type  Is  concerned, 
It  appears  that  In  most  countries  schemes  ar·e·:  being  Introduced  in  a 
large  variety  of  sectors,  while  In  som~  countries  such  as 
Lyxemboyrg,  Portugal  and  the  UK,  the  flnanc~· sector  uses  them  more 
than  the  average.  ;;~ 
rl~·~i~~:  .:,_,·. 
... ,· 
;r_  Emcloyees  Involved 
In  France  and  the  UK  large  numbers  of  employees  take  part  in 
financial  participation  schemes.  In  France,:\"fhe  different  types  of 
schemes  cover  almost  6  million  employees,  of,whom  around  4  million 
actually  participate  (around  18%""of  all  employees).  This  is  not 
surprising  considering  France  has  had  the  longest  tradition,  and  has 
made  some  schemes  compulsory.  In  the  UK  3.5-·mlll ion  employees  are 
eligible  to  participate  In  financial  partlclp~tion  schemes,  but  the 
actual  number  benefiting  has  been  estlmated·-(c)  be  2  million  (around 
8%  of  a I I  emp I oyees) •  ·.;.;:,; 
~-i~:; 
In  other  countries  the  percentage  of  empfd,yees  participating  Is 
lower.  In  the  Netherlands  some  350,000  empYoyees  participated  in 
profit-sharing  schemes  In  the  mld-l970s  <aroun.d  7.4%  of  all, or  12% 
of  market  sector  emp I oyees >.  wh I I e  In  Germa~Y~- 1 . 3  m  I I I I on  emp I oyees 
•  are currently  Involved  in  financial  partlclpat.ion  schemes  (around  5% 
of all  employees).  For  Ireland no official  f'fgures  are  available but 
an  estimate  suggests  that  some  40,000  employees  currently participate 
In  share-based  profit-sharing  schemes  (mor~  than  3%  of  total). 
Variable  remuneration  linked  to  enterprise  performance  Is  given  In 
.l.1A.!Y  to some  2%  of  emp I oyees.  .. 
.  -~ .; .  ' 
However,  these  figures  may  be  overestimates  considering  that  In  some 
countries  the  same  Individuals  may  partlc~fp'ate  simultaneously  In 
different  types  of  schemes.  Nor  are·  therse  co'lintry  figures  directly 
comparable  since  they  are  sometimes  relate_d  to  Quite  different 
schemes.  .  ,:_'i• 
···  ..•.. · 
Not  all  schemes  are  available  for  all  employe~s nor  do  all  eligible 
employees  necessarily  participate.  In  the·'  case  of  discretionary 
schemes  for  certain  groups  of  employees,  wh'_i,c'il  are  by  far  the  most 
popular  type  of  scheme  In  some  countries  <.!JK.-,·  Ireland),  most  often 
on I y  a  sma I I  percentage  of  employees  benefIt·: <In  the  UK  usua II  y  no 
more  than  10%  of  employees).  At  the  same  tIme',· In  share  opt Ions  or 
other  types  of  schemes  ava II  ab 1  e  to  a II  employees.  the  degree  of 
participation  Is  not  always  high.  Although _1St  example  In  Germany, 
the  participation  rate  of  employees  In  sctu~mes  offered  has  been 
around  80",  In  the  UK,  In  SAVE-type  share' option  schemes  the 
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E-5  Emoloyee  benefits 
24.  At  present  the  benefits  accruing  to  workers  from  financial 
participation  schemes,  whether  on  the  basis  of  profit-sharing  or  of 
employee  share-ownershl~.  In  most  cases  remain  small. 
The  amount  allocated  to  profit-sharing  hardly  ever  exceeds  10%  of 
average  employee  earnings  and  5% of  enterprise  profits.  In  France 
the profit share per  employee  In  both  cash-based and  deferred profit-
sharing schemes  amounts  to around  3-4%  of  the wage  bill, while  In  the 
Netherlands  the  share  amounts  to  4.5-6.5%  of  average  employee 
earnings.  In  the  UK  profit-related  pay  accounts  for  around  7%  of 
average  earnings,  but  In  share-based  schemes  It  usually  does  not 
exceed  2-4%  of  tot  a I  wages.  Some  Ita II an  enterprIses  gIve  theIr 
employees  substantial  variable  pay,  but  the  sectoral  averages  range 
from  3  to  8%  of  the  minimum  nat lonal  wage.  In  ~.  varIable 
payments  to employees  In  some  cases  have  amounted  to  10-25%  of  total 
pay,  but  average  payments  linked  to profits usually  represent  no  more 
than  5%  of  labour  costs. 
In  employee  share-ownership  schemes,  excluding  share  offers  as  part 
of  pr I  vat lzat ton  measures,  the  percentage  of  shares  reserved  for 
employees  In  most  cases  has  not  exceeded  5%  of  the  tot  a I  shares 
1  ssued.  and  the  dIscount  on  shares  (If  ava II ab I  e>  has  usua I I  y  been 
rather  low. 
E-6  Summary  Table 
25.  The  annexed  summary  table  based  on  the  findings  of  the  PEPPER-Report 
presents  an  overview,  In  a  comparative  framework,  of  the  EC  Member 
States'  general  attitude towards  financial  participation,  legislation 
and  tax  benefIts,  the  most  frequent  types  of  schemes  adopted  by 
enterprises and,  where  available,  some  other  relevant  figures  (on  the 
number  of  schemes,  firms  and  employees  Involved;  and  average  profit 
shares per  employee  or  other  benefits). 
0 
F.  Evidence on  the effects of financial  participation schemes 
26.  Sections  12  and  13  contain  the main  theoretical  arguments  advanced  In 
favour  of  or  against  financial  participation  schemes.  In  this 
chapter  the  empirical  evidence  concerning  these  arguments  Is 
examined. 
Theoretical  arguments  advanced  In·  favour  of  financial  participation 
schemes  claim  the  following  principal  types  of  beneficial  effect  : 
the  Incentive  effect,  which  Is  expected  to  result  In  higher  labour 
productivity  and  Improved  enterprise  performance;  and  major  wage 
flexibility,  which  Is  expected  to  result  In  less  variable  employment 
and/or  higher  employment,  both  at  the  enterprise  and  at  the  macro-
economic  level. 
In  evaluating  the  effects  of  financial  participation  schemes,  two 
sources  of  lnformat lon  are  available  :  econometr lc  est lmates  and 
surveys  on  the  attitude  of  employees  and  firms  towards  these 
schemes. - 14  -
However,  the  evidence  reported  Is  prel lmlnary  and  ought  to  be 
Interpreted  cautiously.  On  the  one  hand,  attitude  surveys  are  based 
on  the  perception of  effects,  and  not  the  effec~s themselves.  On  the 
other  hand,  although  econometric  models  are  a  more  objective  source 
of  InformatIon,  there  are  a  number  of  specific  prob I  ems  I  nvo 1  ved, 
such  as  the  high  sensitivity of  results  to  model  specification,  the 
Indicators  actually  used  and  estimating  techniQues;  difficulties  in 
Isolating  the  effects  of  profit-sharing  from  other  organisational 
factors  and  external  causes;  ambiguity  concerning  the  separation  of 
cause  from  effect. 
F.1  Incentive effects 
27.  Econometric  estimates  of  the  effects  of  f.inanclal  partl.clpatlon 
schemes  on  employee  motivation  have  so  far  been  few  In  number,  and 
have  exclusively concentrated on  three  count~ies:  Germany.  the  UK  and 
France  (for  which  only one  econometric  study  Is  available).  Evidence 
from  all  three  countries  points  to  positive  net· effects  on  employee 
motivation  and  on  productivity.  The  positive  link  between  profit-
sharIng  and  productIvIty  Is  a I  so  supported  by  a  number  of  sImI I  ar 
·studies  on  the  US.  However,  these  effects  might  for  the  moment  be 
relatively small  because of  the  low  Incidence of  employee  benefits on 
total  earnings. 
There  Is  no  specIfIc scheme  wh l·ch  a  prIor I  has  sIgnIfIcant  advantages 
over  the  others.  The  experience  to  date  nevettheless  suggests  that 
cash-based  schemes  may  have  had  more  significant  Incentive  effects 
than  share-based  schemes.  This  Is  supported  by  both  econometric 
estimates  and  by  attitude  surveys.  In  some  of  these  surveys.  cash-
based  profit-sharing  was  by  far  the  most  popular  scheme,  while  many 
deferred  profit-sharing and  employee  share-ownership schemes  have  not 
achieved  the  objective  of  Increasing  workers'  Involvement  as 
shareholders  and  their  greater  Identification  with  the  Interests  of 
their  enterprise.  This  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  the  fact  that 
Involvement  of  employees  In  capital  participation  schemes  in  Germany 
Is  below  the  maximum,  and  the  freQuent  practice  In  both  France  and 
Britain  of  workers  selling  their  shares  as  soon  as  they  are  allowed 
to.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Individual  employee,  the  crucial 
dIfference  between  the  two  types  of  scheme  seems  to  II e  In  resale 
restrIctIons,  s I  nee  workers  usua I I  y  prefer  to  be  ab I  e  to  cash  In 
their  profit  share  at  any  moment  (In  spite  of  the  fact  that  cash-
based  schemes  In  general  attract  lower,  If  any,  tax  Incentives). 
Therefore.  when  for  whatever  reason  non-cash-based  schemes  are  to  be 
given priority,  they may  need  to be  accompanied  by  certain advantages 
over  cash-based  schemes.  Provided  that  they  are  properly  designed, 
share-based  schemes  could  not  only  have  similar  motivational  effects 
to  cash-based  schemes,  but  could  also  provide  for  a  longer-term 
commitment  by  employees.  Indeed,  there  are  cases  in  which  share-
based  schemes  may  provide  not  only  the  right  incentives,  but  would 
even  be  preferred. 
F.2  Wage  flexlbil ity 
28.  The  effects  of  profit-sharing_ on  employment  through  greater  wage 
flexibility  are  much  more  debatable,  as  the  econometric  evidence  Is 
mixed.  On  the  one  hand,  somo  earlier  evidence  for  the  UK  suggested 
that  profit-sharing  had  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on 
employment,  but  more  recent  estimates  show  that  tho  size  of  the 
effect  may  not  be  very  large.  On  the  other  hand,  evidence  from ------- --~ --- .. 
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France  suggests  that  profit-sharing  has  resulted  In  greater  wage 
flexibility,  less  frequent  adjustments  In  employment,  and  In  higher 
and  more  stable employment  growth. 
F.3  Macroeconomic  effects 
29.  Given  that  profit-sharing  for  the  moment  is  not  sufficiently 
widespread  In  any  single  country  to  have  significant  macroeconomic 
effects,  these  effects  cannot  really  be  empirically  verified. 
Nevertheless,  several  econometric studies suggest  that enterprises  In 
all  three  countries  for  which  estimates  are  available- France, 
GermanY  and  the  UK  - regard  total  remuneration,  and  not  the  basic 
wage,  as  the  marginal  cost  of  labour,  thus  contradicting  the 
fundamental  assumption  of  the  Vanek-Weitzman  hypothesis  (see  section 
12). 
F.4  Link  with  participation  In  decision making 
30.  The  link  between  the  effects  of  financial  participation  and 
participation  In  decision making  essentially depends  on  the specific 
effects  being  tested.  With  regard  to  employment  effects,  existing 
econometric  evidence  Is  mixed,  In  some  cases  offering  support  to  the 
hypothesis  that  the  effects  may  be  higher  If  participation  in 
decision making  Is absent.  On  the other  hand,  prevail lng  evidence on 
Incentive  effects  from  both  econometric  and  more  Informal  studies 
does  suggest  that  the  combination  of  financial  participation  with 
participation  In  decision  making  can  have  significant  beneficial 
effects.  The  less positive attitude of employees  towards  share-based 
schemes  seems  to  be  related  to  the  practice  In  several  countries 
whereby  employees  are  not  always  offered  the  same  r lghts  as  other 
shareholders  (primarily  voting  rights).  More  employee  participation 
In  decision-making  may  Indeed,  In  many  Instances,  substantially 
facilitate  the  achievement  of  some  of  the  objectives  of  financial 
participation schemes. 
G.  Cross-border  extension of financial  participation schemes  In  the  EC 
31.  The  data  In  the  three  preceding  chapters about  the existing  legal  and 
fiscal  framework,  the practice of  financial  participation schemes  and 
on  the  evIdence  of  theIr  effects,  are  essent I  a II y  drawn  from  the 
PEPPER-Report.  The  examination  of  the  practice  of  financial 
participation  In  the  EC-countrles,  the  legal  framework  etc.  by  the 
PEPPER-Report,  was  basically  carried  out  within  the  existing  legal 
and  fiscal  framework  of  each  Individual  country,  I.e.  with  a 
"national"  perspective,  and  then compared  with  the other  countries.  A 
number  of  reactions  to  this approach  have  made  the Commission  realise 
that  In  this  way  certain  Intra-community  aspects  of  financial 
participation are not  sufficiently covered. 
A number  of  multinational  enterprises  operating  at  a  European  level 
(and  this  number  Is  only  likely  to  grow)  want,  for  various  reasons, 
to  make  the  benefits of  financial  participation  schemes  available  to 
their  employees  In  different  EC-countrles  under  comparable 
conditions.  In  addition  to  the  usual  motives which  companies  may  have 
for  using  financial  participation  schemes  In  a  national  context, 
these  companies  also have  transnational  motives  like using  financial 
participation as  a  means  of  reinforcing  corporate  Identity  and  the 
sense  of  belonging  to  a  multinational  group.  Alternatively  they  may - 16  -
be  faced  with  practical  problems  arising  when  employees  within  the 
group  wish  to remain  participant  In  a  financial  participation scheme 
also  when  they  are  transferred  to  work  In  a  different  part  of  the 
group  In  another  country.  In  addition,  when  a-multinational  operates 
a  successful  scheme  In  one  particular  country,  e.g.  Its  country  of 
origin,  employees  In  other  countries often ask  for  something  similar. 
At  present,  enterprises  wishing  to  cross  borders  with  their 
financial  participation  schemes,  are  confronted  with  a  number  of 
obstacles. 
These obstacles can  broadly  be  grouped  Into  three general  categories: 
a)  soc lo-cu I tura I  d·l fferences  between  the member  :states; 
b)  differences  In  fiscal/financial  treatment  of  schemes; 
c)  administrative/procedural  requirements. 
The  socio-cultural  differences  between  ·member  states  are  In 
themselves  not  the  major  obstacle,  but  may  require of  the  enterprise 
concerned  additional  efforts  to  explain  what  Is  Intended  or  may 
require  It  to engage  In  different  ways  of  dealing  with  employees  and 
their  representatives  than  what  It  Is  used  to  do.  More  information 
about  alI  aspects of  financial  participation schemes  distributed on  a 
wide  scale  as  this  Recommendation  will  encourage,should  already  have 
a  favourable  Impact  on  overcoming  such  imponderable  barriers. 
The  second  category,  differences  In  fiscal/financial  treatment  of 
financial  participation  schemes,  Is  where  the  largest  number  of 
problems  originate.  In  countries  where  some  type  of  financial 
participation  scheme  Is  made  attractive  by  government  In  particular 
through  fiscal  Incentives,  that  type of  scheme  generally  Is  the one 
most  commonly  Introduced  by  enterprises  (see  also  section 34).  It  Is 
understandable  that  when  those  enterprises  want  to  apply  a  similar 
scheme  abroad  and  when  these  Incentives  then  are  not  available,  the 
scheme  In  question  may  become  much  less  attractive  and  even 
conditions of  taxation and  social  security contributions may  make  Its 
use  In  certain  countries  prohibitively  expensive.  Enterprises 
recognize  that  each  country  has  Its  own  fiscal  and  social  security 
system  and  that  differences  In  those  systems  will  persist  for  many 
more  years  in  the  EC.  At  the  same  time,  however,  they  observe  that 
certain details of  these  fiscal  and  social  security  regulations  make 
cross-border  application  of  financial  participation  schemes 
unnecessarily  cumbersome  and  that  things  could  be  facilitated  by 
revising  such  details  without  having  to  perform  a  maJor  overhaul  of 
these  regulations.  This  could  be  done  without  any  attempt  to 
.harmonize  fiscal  or  social  security  systems  -which  would  clearly 
lie  beyond  the  scope  of  thIs  Recommendation.  Such  observations  are 
mainly  related  to  the  treatment  of  employee  share-ownership  and 
stock-option schemes  In  several  countries. 
The  third category,  administrative  hurdles,  creates similar  problems, 
although of  a  less  fundamental  character,  and  therefore  in  the  end  of 
a  less prohibitive nature. 
In  some  countries  there. are  procedures  for  recognition  of  financial 
participation  schemes,before  one  can  benefit  from  an  advantageous 
fiscal/financial  treatment.  These  procedures  can  contain  e1ements 
which  are  more  difficult  to  satisfy  by  a  foreign  than  by  a  domestic 
enterprise.  There  aro often  requirements  for  a  considerable amount  of - 17-
Information  to  be  supplied  e.g.  when  shares  are  Issued  to  be  made 
available  to employees.  Sometimes  there  Is  an  obligation to use  local 
lntermedlalrles  for  the  handling  of  a  scheme  In  order  for  It  to  be 
recognized.  Employee  share-ownership  may  cause  problems  when  the 
shares  are  not  quoted  nor  traded  In  a  particular  country.  Schemes 
which  use  trusts  or  Joint  Investment  funds  may  encounter  problems 
when  these  ent It I  es  are  not  eas I I  y  recognIzed  abroad  ( prob I  em  of 
legal  status). 
Although  most  of  theseobstacles  can  In  the  end  be  overcome,  their 
existence  may  either  discourage  enterprises  from  extending  their 
f Inane I  a 1  partIcIpatIon  schemes  abroad  or  often  at  least  Increases 
their  costs.  It  Is  worth  examining  to  what  extent  things  could 
already  be  faci lltated  by  a  wider  use of  an  approach  based  on  mutual 
recognition. 
At  this stage  the Commission  can offer  no  ready-made  solutions  to  the 
problems  caused  by  administrative  hurdles  and/or  by  differences  In 
fiscal/financial  treatment.  It  therefore  proposes  to  have  them 
examined  by  a  working  party  composed  of  experts  from  all  member 
states.  Cross-border  application  of  financial  participation  schemes 
In  the  EC  would  benefit  tremendously  from  the existence of  formulae, 
which,  when  adhered  to,  would  be  more  or  less  automatically 
recognIzed  In  a I 1  member  states  and  wou I  d  then  qua I I  fy  In  each 
country  for  treatment  which  would  be  known  In  advance  and  operate  as 
far  as possible under  comparable  conditions.  Thus  It  Is suggested  to 
charge  the  working  party  with  examining  possibil itles  for  the 
creation  of  formulae  of  financial  participation  by  employees  at  a 
European  level  for  each  one  of  the  following  three  types of  schemes: 
a)  a  profit-sharing scheme; 
b)  an  employee  share ownership  scheme; 
c)  a  stock options scheme. 
H.  Related  Issues and  developments 
32.  The  promotion  of  financial  participation schemes  does  not  take  place 
In  a  vacuum,  but  Is  related  to  several  other  relevant  socio-economic 
developments.  The  most  Important  of  these  re Ia ted  developments  are 
mentioned  here  not  only  to  draw  attention  to  their  relationship with 
financial  participation  schemes,  but  also  to  Indicate  unambiguously 
that  these  Issues  themselves  lie  beyond  the  scope  of  this  draft 
Recommendation  and  are  therefore not  being dealt with  In  any  detail. 
Related  Issues,  not  subJect of  this Recommendation  are  : 
general  procedures  for  Information,  Consultation  and 
Participation  in  Enterprises; 
general  trends  In  wage  policies  and  wage  negotiation,  Including 
(Individual)  performance  related pay  systems; 
general  trends  In  private share-ownership and  asset-formation; 
cooperative enterprises and  the  cooperative movement; 
the  European  Company  Statute; 
the  llberallsatlon of  financial  services  and  capital  markets  in 
connection with  the  achievement  of  the  Internal  Market; 
financing of  (supplementary)  pension  provisions. . ' 
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l.  Role of  the social  partners 
33.  The  social  partners  play  a  crucial  role  both  In  the  preparation  of 
financial  participation  systems  and  In  their  Implementation.  The 
positions  and  attitudes  of  the  two  sld_es  of  industry  In  various  EC 
countr les  have  so  far  been  rather  dIvergent.  Of  course,  there  are 
important  differences  concerning  the  extent  to  which  financial 
part I  c t pat I  on  schemes  have  been  a  topIc  __  for  discuss I  on  between  the 
social  partners and  this  Is  reflected  In  their  positions. 
In  countries  where  these  schemes  are  rarely  used,  ~ployers 
ftSSoclatlons  do  not  yet  seem  to  have  adopted  a  definite  standpoint. 
Elsewhere,  employers  associations  generally  have  emphasised  their 
support  for  enterprise-level  schemes,.  provided  they ·can.be  Introduced 
on  a  voluntary  basis  and  the  final  design  of  the  schemes  can  be 
decided  at  enterprise  level.  The  availability  of  tax  facilities  is 
an  Important  incentive  to  use  such  schemes  but  not  the  overriding 
motIve.  Employers  usua II y  consIder  f I  nanc I  a I  part I  c I  pat Jon  schemes 
an  Important  instrument  for  Improving  employee  motivation  and 
commitment  to  the  enterprise's  Interests.  In  this  connection  the 
employers'first  preference  generally  seems  to  be  for  share-based 
types of  schemes  (where  practicable). 
Trade  unions  have  often been  reluctant  to facilitate  the  introduction 
of  financial  participation schemes. 
They  have  several  major  concerns  : 
they  are  unhappy  that  these  schemes  are  frequently  Introduced 
unilaterally  by  employers,  which  makes  them  suspicious  about 
the  real  motives  behind  the  schemes; 
financial  participation  schemes  might  lead  to  increased 
inequality  between  wage-earners,  e.g.  between  those  working  in 
very  profitable sectors and  others  In  less  flourishing  sectors; 
financial  participation  schemes  may  lead  to  high  risks  for  the 
workers  Involved  If  for  example  a  very  substantial  part  of  their 
Income  becomes  varlab.le or  if  they  build up  substantial  holdings 
of  bonds  or  shares  issued  by  their  employer  (see section 13); 
the  introduc.t lon  of  such  schemes  might  be  used  to  circumvent  or 
weaken  col lectlve wage  negotiations; 
if  tax-Incentives  were  to  lead  to  a  serious  loss  of  tax  income 
for  the State,  this money  would  then  have  to be  sought  elsewhere 
or  the  State might  be  tempted  to  reduce  the  level  of  collective 
services. 
As  an  a I ternat I  ve  trade  unions  have  often  put  forward  proposa Is  on 
collective  forms  of  profit-sharing  by  means  of  wage-earners'  funds; 
these  are  regarded  as  an  important  Instrument  for  a  more  even 
distribution of  income  and  wealth. 
Nevertheless,  many  trade  unions  now  have  more  pragmatic positions on 
financial  participation.  These  have  evolved  with  the  actual  diffusion 
of  schemes  in  practice  and  range  from  giving  more  outrigU  support 
In  some  countries  to  a  more  walt-and-see  attitude  in  others.  In 
several  countries  where  the  central  trade  union  associations  do  not 
yet  fully  accept  financial  participation,  many  local  trade  unions 
have  a  more  positive stance,  actively participating  in  the  signing of 
agreements,  which  they  expect  to  produce  po8!tlve  effects  for  their 
members. - 19  -
In  order  to  create a  climate of  constructive cooperation  between  the 
social  partners  on  these  matters,  It  seems  therefore  essential  that 
when  financial  participation  schemes  are  being  Introduced,  this  Is 
done  on  a  voluntary  basis  on  both  sides  and  seriously  negotiated 
between  them.  The  existence  of  financial  participation  schemes 
should  not  weaken  nor  subst ltute  for  the  normal  wage  negotIatIons 
between  the  social  partners  dealing  with  basic  wages  and  other  work 
conditions. 
J.  Ro I  e  of governments 
34.  The  development  of  financial  participation  schemes  Is  strongly 
Influenced  by  government  action.  Governments  are  primarily 
responsible  for  the  creation of  a  legal  and  fiscal  framework  that  may 
favour  such  schemes  but  may  also  Impede  their  Introduction.  This  Is 
I I lustrated  by  the  finding  of  the  PEPPER-report  that  In  those 
countries  where  a  particular  type  of  financial  participation scheme 
has  been  encouraged  by  government,  the  schemes  most  commonly 
Introduced  by  enterprises  are  Indeed  the  ones  promoted  through 
official  government  measures.  In  particular  the  aval lability of  tax 
Incentives  makes  a  big  difference.  Such  Incentives  may  only  be 
needed  temporarily  :  once  the  relevant  scheme  has  gained  a  certain 
momentum,  the  Incentive  may  be  reduced  or  phased  out.  The  findings 
of  the  PEPPER-report  suggest  that  the  potential  advantages  of 
financial  participation  schemes  would  justify  governments  giving 
serious consideration  to  the  Introduction of  such  fiscal  facil lties. 
At  present,  different official  government  positions  In  Individual  EC-
countrles  must  be  seen  against  a  background  of  differing  traditions 
and  especially  large  differences  In  actual  experience  In  practise 
with  regard  to  financial  participation  schemes.  In  countries  I ike 
France  and  the  UK  government  policies  have  been  actively  encouraging 
the  use  of  financial  participation schemes  for  a  considerable  number 
of  years.  In  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  .!.!A..!..Y.  and 
.1.!1§.  Netherlands,  financial  participation  schemes  of  various  types 
have  been  the  subject  of  national  debate  but  government  support  has 
either  been  limited  or  lacking,  or  has  emerged  fairly  recently.  An 
Important  Issue  in  pol It leal  discussions  In  many  countries  has  been, 
and  to  some  extent still  Is,  whether  schemes  at  enterprise-level,  or 
more  central  collective  schemes,  ought  to  be  encouraged.  In  Denmark, 
Germany  and  l.!.A..!..Y..  In  particular,  the  Issue  of  economy-wide  wage-
earners'  funds  was  at  the  centre  of  the  debate,  but  due  to  the 
absence  of  a  general  consensus  and  Insufficient  support  for· 
compulsory  collective  arrangements,  none  of  the  proposals  advanced 
have  been  adopted.  In  Luxembourg,  Portugal  and~. the  financial 
participation  Issue  has  so  far  received  only  limited  attention,  nor 
has  It  been  among  the  priority  Issues  for  discussion  between  the 
social  partners.  Only  very  recently  and  possibly  In  connection  with 
the  Commission's  announcement  of  a  Community  Instrument  and  the 
publication  of  the  PEPPER-report,  has  Interest  in  financial 
participation matters  Increased  In  some  of  these countries. 
Governments  have  so  far  basically  operated  from  a  national 
perspective  In  matters  of  financial  participation.  As  set  out  in 
sect ion  31,  the  exIstIng  nat lona I  I  ega I  and  f I  sea I  frameworks  do 
contain  a  number  of  obstacles  for  enterprises  practising a  financial 
participation  scheme  In  one  EC-country,  when  they  want  to  make  the 
benefits of  that  scheme  also available,  under  comparable  conditions, 
to  their  employees  In  another  EC-country.  Solutions  for  such 
problems  can  only  be  found  with  the  active  help of governments. - 20  -
Finally,  governments  can  encourage  the  use  of  financial  participation 
schemes  by  supplying  adequate  Information  to  all  potentially 
Interested  parties  Including  in  particular  information  about  the 
experiences acquired  In  other  Member  Sates. 
Ill.  THE  ElEMENTS  OF  THE  PROPOSAL 
35.  This  proposal  Is  the  product  of  a  range  of  preparatory  activities. 
These  Include  the  research  project  carried  out  at  the  European 
University  Institute  In  collaboration  with  experts  from  the  member 
states  resu It I  ng  In  the  PEPPER-report.  There  has  a I  so  been  a  w  1  de 
measure  of  consultation  between  the  two  sides  of  Industry  both 
centrally  (under  the  social  dialogue)  and  on  an  industry  basis, 
Involving  all  types  of  undertaking,  Including  small  and  medium  sized 
businesses. 
These  consultations  have  enabled  the  Commission  to  take  note  of  the 
various  points  of  view  regarding  both  the  tlmel lness  of  a  Community 
proposal  In  this  field  and  the  legal  nature  and  content  of  the 
proposed  instrument.  A  Recommendation,  a  Community  instrument  of  a 
non-binding  nature,  was  chosen,  because  In  the  circumstances  It  was 
considered  to  be  the  most  appropriate  oneto  obtain  voluntary  and 
active  support  for  the  Introduction  of  financial  participation 
schemes  from  all  parties concerned. 
36.  ObJective  and  scope 
The  objectIve  of  the  proposa I  Is  to  encourage  the  wl despread  use  of 
different  forms  of  participation  by  employees  in  profits  and 
enterprise  results,  either  by  means  of  profit· sharing,  or  through 
employee  share-ownership or  by  a  combination of  both. 
The  Recommendation  Is  addressed  at  all  EC  governments  but 
acknowledges  that  there  Is  a  great diversity  In  the  schemes  currently 
encountered  In  the  Community  which  It  Is  not  seeking  to  reduce.  At 
the  same  time  there  are  large  differences  between  the  member  states 
as  regards  their  actual  experience  with  financial  participation 
schemes,  which  makes  It  very  useful,  in  particular  for  the  less 
experienced  countries,  to  spread  adequate  information  about  the 
different  schemes  practised,  their  possibilities, effects etc .. 
37.  The  proposed  approach 
More  specifically  member  states are  recommended: 
to  ensure  that  legal  structures  are  adequate  to  allow  the 
Introduction of  the  forms  of  financial  participation referred  to 
In  this Recommendation; 
to  consider  the  possibility  of  according  fiscal  or  other 
financial  Incentives  (the  Importance  of  such  ·Incentives  was 
Indicated  In  section 20); 
1o  facilitate  the  supply  of  information  and  to  take  nccount  of 
experiences  acquired elsewhere  In  the  EC; - 21  -
to  allow  the  social  partners  a  sufficiently  wide  range  of 
options.  from  which  to  chose  at  a  level  close  to  the  employee 
and  to  the enterprise; 
to  encourage  consideration  of  a  number  of  key  characteristics 
(descrIbed  In  sect ion  39)  when  sett lng  up  new  schemes  or  when 
reviewing existing ones; 
to  examine  after  three  years  to  what  extent  financial 
participation by  employees  has  Increased  In  their  country  and  to 
communicate  the  results within  four  years  to  the Commission. 
38.  In  order  to  deal  with  the  cross-border  asoects  of  financial 
oartlcloatlon.  described  In  section  31,  the  Commission  will  set  up  a 
working  party with  a  view  to examining  possibilities for  the creation 
of  formulae  for  the  following  three  types  of  financial  participation 
schemes  by  employees  at  a  European  level,  In  order  to  Improve  the 
opportunities  for  the  application  under  comparable  conditions 
throughout  the Community  of  such  schemes: 
a)  a  profit-sharing scheme; 
b)  an  employee  share ownership  scheme; 
c)  a  stock options scheme. 
39.  Key  characteristics of  financial  oartlclpatlon schemes 
In  this  draft  Recommendation  the  Importance  of  allowing  for  a  wide 
range of alternative schemes  from  which  the most  appropriate ones  can 
be  chosen  has  already  been  underlined.  However.  since  the  success of 
these  schemes  mainly  depends  on  certain key  features.  It  would  seem 
advisable  to  take  Into  account  experiences  already  acQuired 
elsewhere  In  the  EC.  When  new  schemes  are  set  up  or  when  existing 
schemes  are  being  reviewed,  It  Is  therefore  recommended  that  special 
attention  should  be  paid  to  the  following  characteristics.  which 
appear  to be  of  crucial  Importance: 
a)  Regularity:  schemes  benefit  from  application  on  a  regular  basis 
and  from  awardIng  any  "bonus"  at  I  east  once  a  year  or  over 
shorter  periods,  If  major  motivational  effects  are  to  be 
obtained; 
b)  Pre-determined  formula:  the  formu Ia  settIng  employee  benef 1 ts 
should  be  determined  uneQuivocally  before  the  beginning of  each 
reference  period.  Individual  governments  may  decide  whether  one 
or  more  parameters  of  the  formula  should  be  established  at  the 
national  level  (e.g.  through  specific  legislation),  or  whether 
the  formula  can  be  freely  negotiated  between  the  two  sides  of 
Industry,  possibly within  a  legal  framework  set  up  to facilitate 
and  encourage  financial  participation  schemes.  The  formula 
I tse If  shou I  d  not  be  fIxed  once  and  for  a 1 1 •  as  1 t  cou 1  d  be 
renegotiated;  but  neither  should  It  be  subject  to  too  freQuent 
(e.g.  annual)  changes.  since a  number  of  years'  appl icatlon wll 1 
be  reQuired  before sufficient experience  Is  gained; 
c)  No  substitute for  wage  negotiations:  the  existence  of  financial 
participation  schemes  Is  not  to  be  considered  a  substitute  for 
norma I  negotIatIons  dealing  wl th  bas I  c  wages  and  other 
conditions  of  employment.  The  benefits  of  these  schemes  should 
be  received  In  addition  to basic wages  and  should  not  Interfere, 
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Voluntary  part lclpat ion:  both 
employees  should  ·be  able  to 
participate  In  schemes. 
enter~rlses  and 
choose  :~·:.whether  or 
Individual 
not  they 
Calculation of employee  benefits:  bonuses':·.~hould not  ·be  fixed  in 
advance  but  be  var I  ab I  e  and  I Inked  to ·;·'enterpr I  se  performance 
(expressed  In  terms  of  profIts  or- sOme  other  enterprIse 
Indicator)  over  a  certain  period  of  time,  according  . to  a 
previously  agreed  formula;  this  formula  should  also  specify 
unequivocally  the  Indicator  of  enterpr.ise  performance  to  be 
used.  The  findings  of  the  PEPPER-reporf  suggest  that  average 
benefits  amounting  to  less  than  5%  of  guaranteed  employee  wages 
In  a  year  of  regular  profitability,  can  In  themselves  not  be 
expected  to produce  substantial  motivational  effects. 
Risks:  apart  from  a  degree  of  Income  variability  Inherent  to 
financial  participation  schemes,  employees  may  incur  additional 
risks  when  they  acquire  risk-bearing  securities  (e.g.  shares  or 
bonds);  when  these  risks  are  heavily  concentrated  (e.g. 
securities  Issued  by  the  employing  firm)  and  large  In  relation 
to  the  employee's  total  assets,  they  may  come  to  be  considered 
unacceptably  high,  even  though  additional  risks  linked  to 
profit-sharing schemes  may  already  to some  extent  be  compensated 
for  by  the  higher  employment  security  which  profit-sharing  Is 
expected  to  provide.  Under  such  circumstances  It  may  be 
advisable  either  to  seek  a  better  spread  of  risks or  to examine 
posslbll ities of  Insurance  against  too  heavy  losses  in  the  value 
of  these assets. 
g)  Beneficiaries:  beneficiaries are primarily employees,  i.e.  wage-
earners  covered  by  employment  contracts;  benefits  should  as  far 
as possible be  made  available  to all  or  at  least  the  larger  part 
of  the  enterprise's employees  Including  part-time  and  temporary 
employees. 
h)  Enterprise  type:  schemes  can  be  applied  by  both  privately-owned 
firms  and  public enterprises,  as  long  as  suitable  Indicators  of 
enterprise results  or  profits are,  or  can  be,  made  available. 
I)  Enterprise  size:  small  and  medium-sized  firms  should  have 
adequate opportunities to apply  financial  participation schemes; 
In  particular  It  Is  Important  to  ensure  that  administrative 
obligations  are  reasonable  and  minimum  financial  requirements, 
If  needed  at  all,  are  not  too  high;  In  larger  enterprises, 
especially  multi-national  companies,  It  may  be  useful  to  link 
all  or  part  of  employee  benefits  to  the  performance  of  separate 
profit units,  rather  than  to overall  enterprise results. 
J)  Complexity:  schemes  of·  a  complex  nature  are  to  be  avoided,  as 
the  results  are  likely  to be  better  If  the  scheme  can  be  easily 
understood  by  all  employees. 
k)  Information  and  training:  for  the  success of  any  type  of  scheme 
a  substantial  effort  will  be  required  to  supply  adequate 
Information  to  alI  employees  concerned.  ·In  this  regard  the 
Implementation  of  financial  participation  schemes  can  also 
provide  a  link  with  activities  promoted  by  the  Community  In 
other areas:  Information  and  consultation,  training,  education. - 23  -
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
40.  In  submitting this  proposal  for  a  Recommendation  to  the  Council,  the 
Commission,  In  accordance  with  Its  Action  Programme  relating  to  the 
lmplemen_tatlon  of  the  Community  Charter  of  the_  Fundamental  Social 
Rights  for  Workers,  alms  to  underline  the  Importance  which  It 
attaches  to employee  participation  In  profits and  enterprise  results 
either  by  means  of  profit-sharing,  or  through  employee  share-
ownership  or  by  a  combination of both.  This  Is  the  light  In  which  the 
present  draft  Recommendation  should be  viewed. 
Action at  the Community  level  will  mainly  consist of: 
encouraging  the  use  of  financial  participation  schemes  and  the 
exchange  between  user.s  of  exper lences  wl th  these schemes; 
the  supply of  relevant  Information  about  financial  participation 
schemes; 
encouraging  the  creation  of  some  types  of  financial 
participation schemes  to be  used  community-wide  under  comparable 
conditions; 
monitoring  further  developments  In  this field. ·  ··•,:-:-•~·.-.-"~:-T""lh'l"':":'':"'':"\'"  ''7'~1't-? ·~  ...  ~-...,~--.....·~  '"'"•,·•:  ·,'~ ·,  • ,)'J>.•  •. 
.. ANNEX 
FINANCIAL  PARTICIPATION  SCHEMES  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  IN  THE  LATE  1980S 
SUMMARY  OF  PRINCIPAL  FINDINGS  OF  THE  PEPPER  REPORT 
Lilibn,;v l.At ionM: 
PS:  pro!it-Hharing;  SPS:  tJhare-baued  profit-t>hariog;  BSP:  bond-baued  profit-tiharing;  CPS:  cash-baaed  profit-sharing; 
l>PS:  deferred  profit-uharin<:~/invcut.mcnt  fund!!;  ESC:  employee  share-owncrnhip;  SO:  otock.  optiono;  CSO:  dincretionary 
:;hilrc  optionn;  ESOP:  ·employee  ohare  ownership  plans;  EBO:  employee  buy-outu. 
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Proposal  for  a 
COUNCIL  RECOMMENDATION 
concerning  the  promotion of employee  participation 
In  profits and  enterprise results 
(Including equity participation) 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Having  regard  to  the. Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  CommunIty. 
and  In  particular Article 235  thereof, 
Having  regard  to the  proposal  from  the  Convnlsslon. 
Having  regard  to the opinion of  the  European  Par I I  ament. 
Having  regard  to  the opinion of  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee. 
Whereas  In  its  Communication  concerning  the  Action  Programme  relating  to 
the  Implementation  of  the  Community  Charter  of  the  Fundamental  Social 
Rights  of  Workers  the  Commission  announced  Its  Intention  to  present  a 
Community  Instrument  on  equity  sharing  and  financial  participation  by 
workers; 
Whereas  a  report  on  the  promotion  of  employee  participation  In  profits and 
enterprise  results  In  the  Member  states of  the  European  Community  has  been 
prepared  and  whereas  this  report  has  established  that  there  Is  a  great 
variety  In  the  type·s  of  scheme  encountered  In  the  Community,  including cash 
payments.  share-based and  deferred profit-sharing schemes  and  various  types 
of  particular employee  share-ownership schemes; 
Whereas  encouragement  at  Community  level  of  schemes  of  financial 
participation  by  employees  Is  to  be  seen  as  a  means  of  achieving  a  better 
distribution  of  the  wealth  generated  by  enterprises.  while  encouraging  a 
greater  Involvement  of employees  In  the  progress of  their  companies; 
Whereas  while  the  body  of  empirical  research  about  the  effects  of  such 
schemes  In  practice  does  not  yet  provide  overwhelming  evidence  of  strong 
overall  advantages.  there  are  sufficient  Indications  that  such  schemes 
contribute  to  a  number  of  positive  effects.  Including  Improvements  in 
employee  motivation  and  productivity  and  In  the  competitiveness  of 
enterprises; 
Whereas  It  Is  appropriate  to  promote  a  larger  diffusion  of  financial 
participation  schemes  within  the  European  Community,  without  seeking  an 
active  harmonization or  a  reduction  In  the existing wide  range of available 
schemes; 
Whereas  the  ultimate  success  of  this  Community  Initiative  wil 1  to  a  large 
extent  depend  on  the active  Interest  and  Involvement  of  the social  partners 
themselves; l  -
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Whereas  in  the  context  of  the  completion  of  the  Internal  market  It  Is 
necessary  to  study  the  possibilities  for  the  development  of  transnational 
formulae  for  employee  participation  In  profits and  enterprise results; 
Whereas  the  present  action  appears  necessary  to  attain,  In  the  course  of 
-the  operation of  the  common  market,  one  of  the obJectIves of  the Community, 
I.  HEREBY  INVITES  THE  MEMBER  STATES: 
To  acknowledge  the  potential  benefits of  a  wider  use-of  a  broad  variety of 
schemes  to  increase  the  participation  by  employees  In  profits  and 
enterprise  results  either  by  means·  of  profit-sharing,  or  through  employee 
·share-ownership or  by  a  combination of  both. 
II.  HEREBY  RECOMMENDS  THE  MEMBER  STATES: 
.1.  To  ensure  that  legal  structures  are  adequate  to  allow  the 
introduction  of  the  forms  of  financial  participation  referred  to  In 
this  Recommendation; 
2.  To  consider  the  possibility-of  according  Incentives  such  as  fiscal 
or  other  financial  advantages  to  encourage  the  Introduction  of 
certain schemes• 
3.  To  encourage  the  use  of  such  schemes  by  facilitating  the  supply  of 
adequate  Information  to all  relevant  parties; 
4. 
5. 
To  take  account  of  experIences  acquIred  e I  sewhere 
Community  when  considering  giving  preferential 
particular  types of  financial  participation schemes; 
in  the  European 
treatment  to 
To  ensure  that  the  social  partners 
from  a  sufficiently  wide  range 
consultations  between  employers 
representatives; 
have  the  opportunIty  to  choose 
of  options  on  the  basis  of 
and  emp I  oyees  or  the 1  r 
6.  To  ensure  that  this  choice  can  be  made  at  a ·tevel  which,  taking 
account  of  the  national  practlcs  In  this  regard,  Is  as  close  as 
possible  to  the  employee  and  to  the enterprise 
7.  To  encourage  consideration  of  the  key  Issues  set  out  In  the  Annex 
_when  new  financial  participation  schemes  are  being  prepared  or  when 
existing schemes  are being  reviewed; 
8.  To  examine,  after  a  period  of  three  years  following ·the  adoption  of 
this  Recommendation,  the  data  available  at  a  national  level  on  the 
development  of  financial  participation  by  -employees  and  to 
communicate  the  results to  the  Commission; 
9.  To  enhance  socLal  partners'  awareness  of  the  above  matters. --------------------------- -------·------ -·- -· 
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Ill.  TAKES  NOTE  OF  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTENTION 
10.  To  set  up  a  working  party  to  examine  possibilities  for  the  creation 
at  a  Community  level  of  formulae  of  financial  participation  schemes 
by  employees  In  order  to  Improve  the  opportunities  for  the 
application  under  comparable  conditions  throughout  the  Community  of 
such  schemes;  these would  Include  the  following  three  types: 
a>  a  profit-sharing scheme; 
b)  an  employee  share ownership  scheme; 
c)  a  stock options scheme. 
11.  To  submit  a  report  to  the  Councl 1  on  the  appl lcatlon  of  this 
Recommendation  within  four  years  of  Its adoption  on  the  basis of  the 
Information  supplied  to  It  by  the Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  For  the Counc 1 I 
The  President 
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Key  Issues  to be  considered when  new  financial  participation schemes 
are being  prepared or  when  existing schemes  are being  reviewed 
Regularity:  schemes  benefit  from  application  on  a  regular  basis  and 
from  awarding  any  "bonus"  at  least  once  a '.year  or  over  shorter 
periods. 
Pre-determined  formula:  the  formula  setting employee  benefits should 
be  determined  unequivocally  before  the  beginning  of  each  reference 
period. 
No  substitute  for  wage  negotiations:  the  existence  of  financial 
participation schemes  Is  not  to be  considered  a  substitute for  normal 
negotiations dealing with  wages  and  other  conditions of  employment. 
Voluntary  part iclpat ton:  both  enterpr lses  and  individual  employees 
should  be  able  to  choose  whether  or  not  they  want  to  apply  for  or 
participate  In  schemes. 
Calculation  of  employee  benefits:  bonuses  should  not  be  fixed  In 
advance  but  variable  and  linked  to enterprise  performance  (expressed 
In  terms  of  profits  or  some  other  enterprise  indicator)  over  a 
certain  period  of  time,  according  to  a  previously  agreed  formula; 
this  formula  should  also  specify  unequivocally  the  Indicator  of 
enterprise performance  to be  used. 
6.  Amounts:  In  order  to  produce  the  expected  motivational  effects  the 
average  size  of  bonuses  should  on  the  one  hand  be  significant  In 
relation  to  the  fixed  part  of  employees'  wages,  whl  le  on  the  other 
hand  a  cell lng  (In  amounts  or  In  percentages)  might  be  advisable  In 
order  to avoid wide  fluctuations  In  total  income. 
7.  ~:  apart  from  some  Income  variabll lty  Inherent  to  schemes, 
employees  may  Incur  add It lona I  rIsks  when  they  acquIre  rIsk-bearIng 
securities  (e.g.  shares  or  bonds);  when  these  risks· are  heavily 
concentrated  (e.g.  Issued  by  the  employing  firm)  and  large  in 
relation  to  the  employee's  total  assets  the  possibility of  some  form 
of  Insurance  against  too  heavy  losses  in  the  value  of  these  assets 
merits careful  examination. 
8.  Beneficiaries:  beneficiaries  are  prlmarl ly  employees,  I .e.  wage-
earners covered  by  employment  contracts;  as  far  as possible access  to 
schemes  should  be  open  to  all  employees  of  the  enterprise.  More 
generally,  workers  in  the  same  objective situation  should  have  equal 
rights with  regard  to access  to participation schemes. 
9.  Enterprise  type:  schemes  can  be  applied  by  both  privately-owned  firms 
and  public enterprises,  as  long  as  suitable  Indicators of  enterprise 
results or profits are,  or  can  be,  made  available. - 31  -
10.  Enterorlse  size:  small  and  medium-sized  firms  should  have  adequate 
opportunities to apply  financial  participation schemes;  In  particular 
It  Is  Important  to  ensure  that  administrative  obligations  are 
reasonable and  minimum  financial  requirements,  If  needed  at all  ,  are 
not  too  hI gtl;  . In .  I  arger  enterpr l_setJ.,  . ~spec. I  a I I  y  rnu It 1-:-na t I  on~  I 
companies,  It  may  be  useful  to  link  all  or  part  of  employee  benefits 
to  the  performance  of  separate  profit  units,  rather  than  to  overall 
enterprise results. 
11.  comolexltv:  schemes  of  a  complex  nature  are  to  be  avoided,  as  the 
results  are  likely  to  be  better  If  the  scheme  can  be  easl ly 
understood  by  all  employees; 
12.  Information  and  training:  for  the  success  of  any  type  of  scheme  a 
substantial  effort  will  be  required  to  supply  adequate  Information 
and  training,  If  necessary,  to all  employees  concerned. 
,., ' 
~  r 
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